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In recent years the cultural pessimistic position has become known, according to
which we live in an “age of post-truth.” is thesis is supported by the observation
of an increasing use of argumenta ad passiones in politics. In contrast to this view,
I believe that “time” and “representation” play a more decisive role in individual
post-truth arguments than the appeal to passiones. By analysing typical post-truth
arguments, I arrive at a much more positive view on the present age: the designa-
tion of individual arguments as "post-truth" is already an expression of a process of
enlightenment.
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Usually the term “post-truth” (or “post-factual”) is associated with the
concept of emotion: post-truth arguments target the recipient’s emotions
and are supported by the fact that they are forwarded by authorities or by
a broad mass of people. In the classical terminology of dialectics and eris-
tic, a post-truth argument conceals an argumentum ad passiones (argument
to emotion), which is supported by an argumentum ad verecundiam (ar-
gument from authority) or an argumentum ad populum (argument from
majority). ese denitions are usually accompanied by the culturally pes-
simistic diagnosis that we are living in an age of post-truth due to the mul-
titude of post-truth arguments, as if the age of post-truth is now dawning
aer the age of truth.
In contrast to this usual denition, which puts argumenta ad passiones
in the foreground, I will argue in this paper that emotions play only a sec-
ondary role in understanding the concept of post-truth. In my opinion,
there are two factors that aremore decisive for the eectiveness of post-truth
arguments: on the one hand, I believe that time is an essential factor for the
eectiveness of post-truth arguments; and, on the other hand, the loss of the
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concepts of truth and reference in modern rationalist epistemology favours
post-truth arguments.
Furthermore, I believe that the debate on a post-truth era should not be
interpreted as a cultural pessimism. Aer all, the diagnosis of a post-truth
age can only be justied if we know that certain arguments appear more
oen in a given period of time, and that these arguments later turn out to
be “alternative,” untrue or false. But the knowledge of such arguments is,
in my opinion, an expression of investigation, revealing and thus enlight-
enment. Both individual post-truth arguments and the general diagnosis
of a post-truth era thus point to a process of investigation, revealing, and
enlightenment that follows both in time.
I consider the term “enlightenment” to be the most appropriate for the
process described here: it describes both the individual activity of enlight-
enment (i.e. a process of investigation, research, revealing etc.) and the gen-
eral tendency (of a society or an age) that individuals or institutions are al-
lowed to pursue this activity. Especially the general epoch designation of the
enlightenment-term seems tome to bemore appropriate than the expression
of an “age of post-truth”: To me, “enlightenment” stands for a general state
in which some judgments are true and some judgments are not true (and, of
course, with the goal that truth prevails).e expression of an “age of post-
truth” implies a general either-or decision: either we live in an “age of post-
truth,” in which all statements are doubtful or even untrue, or we live in an
“age of truth,” in which all judgments are true and certain.e two either-or
expressions, however, seem to me to characterize the current state only ex-
aggerated. At rst, I will present a simple model for analysing the post-truth
concept in section 1. I distinguish between specic arguments and a general
time diagnosis. I also distinguish between the social actors who transmit
post-truth arguments and those who receive them. is model will show
why emotions are secondary and why the time factor plays a much more
decisive role for an epistemological analysis of post-truth. I will clarify why
the focus of the epistemological analysis is on those actors who consciously
make use of them and who are immune to enlightening processes of post-
truth arguments.
In section 2, I will argue for the second thesis, namely that the crisis
of the concept of truth and representation in philosophy does not prevent,
but rather supports, the inuence of post-truth arguments in academic, po-
litical and public debates. I will clarify this thesis with a rationalist episte-
mology, which explicitly opposes the notion of truth and reference of naïve
representationalism.is rationalism advocates that reference and truth are
concepts that should not play a central role in epistemological models. It
follows that this philosophy itself is part of the general post-truth period di-
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agnosis. It is striking that the rationalism presented dominates precisely in
those areas in which post-truth arguments are increasingly enlightened by
non-philosophical actors.
Finally, in section 3, the so-called “Sweden argument” from 18 February
2017 is analysed in particular. I would like to present a proposal for the anal-
ysis of such post-truth arguments, which is based on the model of a non-
naïve, but rational, representationalism. is rational representationalism
advocates that references and representations, which are important for the
concept of truth, are already part of rationalism and should therefore not
be avoided. e reference (to sensually perceptible reality) is a concept that
can only be meaningfully replaced in our epistemological models if one also
accepts that post-truth arguments cannot be enlightened.
1. Post-truth and enlightenment
In this section, I will rst analyse the post-truth concept and point out that
it can be used as a specic argument as well as a general time diagnosis.
Both forms of use presuppose the concepts of investigation, revealing, and
enlightenment. I will then propose a simple model of the social actors. I
dierentiate between those who use post-truth arguments and those who
receive them. It will become apparent that the concept of emotion does not
necessarily have to play a role in connection with those arguments. More
important is the period of time between the occurrence of a particular ar-
gument and its enlightenment as a post-truth argument. Above all, I will fo-
cus on those social actors who deliberately use and receive post-truth argu-
ments. In my opinion, it is primarily the task of philosophical epistemology
to provide a model that focuses on these social actors and their arguments.
As I have already announced, I believe that the rhetoric of a “post-Truth
era” already implies the process of investigation, revealing, and enlighten-
ment. e rhetoric is part of a diagnosis that an unusually high level of
false information, untrue reports or alternative facts, so-called “post-truth
arguments” (= PTA), occur within a certain period of time.e meaning is
therefore more moderate and relative than the general expression itself. In
order to be able to make this diagnosis at all, however, PTAs must have been
followed by processes of investigation, revealing, and enlightenment (= PE)
through which the individual arguments were exposed as false or untrue. A
clear distinction must be made between the individual case and the overall
diagnosis: it is only through the individual PE of a PTA that it can be at-
tributed to the post-truth age. From the sum of the individual PTAs and the
respective PE results the total diagnosis, according to which one is living in
an age of post-truth. However, since this overall diagnosis can only be estab-
lished through individual cases of individual enlightenment, the realization
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that one is living in the age of post-truth is already an expression of a general
age of enlightenment.
PTAs are particularly problematic if they have already had an eect on
recipients (consumers of arguments), either (R1) temporarily or (R2) in the
long term. is can happen for two reasons: (R1) there is a time dierence
between the introduction of the PTA and the PE, so that the recipient has
committed a particular act in which she was inuenced by the PTA and in
which the act could have been avoided if she would have been aware of the
PE. ese recipients have thus fallen victim to unawareness. In this case,
the time between the occurrence of PA and PE plays a major role. (R2)e
recipient agrees with the PTA without taking note of PE, even if she had
previously had the opportunity to do so. In this case, it is not ignorance
but the prejudice that makes recipients receptive to PTAs. As I will argue in
more detail later on, it is the time before the appearance of the PTA which
is crucial for those recipients.
Speakers (producer of arguments) use the PTAs for two reasons, either
(S1) unconsciously or (S2) consciously. (S1) Speakers unconsciously use PTAs
in the time span (R1) that extends between the reception of the PTA and the
PE. ey do not (yet) know that they have endorsed a PTA and therefore
continue to disseminate it so that other recipients could also endorse it. (S2)
Speakers consciously use a PTA because they expect to gain an advantage
from it. However, they are also consciously taking a risk: they know that
the validity of their PTA will be enlightened by a PE in a foreseeable future
and may therefore have no or even a negative eect on recipients. On the
one hand, speakers like to take this risk because they know that a group of
recipients (R2) will not be convinced by a PE in the long run. On the other
hand, they also take the risk as they hope that the other group of recipients
(R1) will endorse a large number of PTAs before they are confronted with
any PE.us, they try to immunise the one group (R1) by PTAs and make
them resistant before any PE occurs. As a result, members of (R1) become
permanently to members of the other group (R2).ese speakers know that
their PTAs are at risk from PEs, but they also know that there is usually a
time dierence between PTAs and PEs, in which (R1) can become (S1) or
in which (R1) can become (R2), or in which (R2) consolidates their opinion.
e conscious use of PTA is therefore a postponement syndrome: post-truth
is a procrastination of enlightenment.
is procrastination of enlightenment is reected in various phenomena
in which a certain period of time elapses between the expression of the PTA
and its rectication by PE: (1) the procrastination of enlightenment becomes
evident when recipients of PTAs regret their own actions retrospectively af-
ter they have gone through an PE. For instance, some Brexit proponents
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regret the election decision to leave the EU; some republicans regret their
election decision in the US presidential election campaign in 2016.ey feel
betrayed by PTAs and therefore usually belong to (R1). (2)e procrastina-
tion of enlightenment is also evident in the fact that individual PTAs as such
can be claried by means of so-called “fact checking”: for example, it was
shown that the “Bowling Green Massacre” argument of 2 February 2017 or
the so-called “Sweden argument” of 18 February 2017 are based on false or
so-called “alternative facts.” I will elaborate on this in section 3. (3)e pro-
crastination of enlightenment will also be shown by the fact that PTAs are
endorsed, even though the facts speak against these arguments. It is there-
fore likely that the alleged PTAwill turn out to be a deliberate misjudgment:
e. g. when arguments and facts are put forward against climate change inde-
pendently of the prevailing scientic opinion (keyword: march of science).
Here, speakers and recipients deliberately procrastinate PE because they ei-
ther promise a temporary prot of PTA or they will not experience the con-
sequences when PE becomes obvious.
Although the model used so far has not even been worked out in detail,
I hope that I have rst of all shown that emotions or argumenta ad passiones
do not have to be an essential part of the analysis of the concept of post-truth.
Emotionsmay be a single means, but they are neither a necessarymeans nor
the goal of PTAs. In other words, argumenta ad passiones can be a sucient
reason that (R1) may be convinced of PTAs for a certain period or that (R2)
may even be permanently convinced of PTAs; but they are not the necessary
condition to understand certain PTAs or the general time diagnosis. If we
were to claim that our general time diagnosis is based on the fact that ar-
gumenta ad passiones alone are becoming increasingly eective, we would
also have to explain why people are yet more receptive to emotional argu-
ments than 50 years ago. We could probably only support this by claiming
that the nature of man has changed—in contrast to the era of truth. I think
it is unlikely that such support can be plausible.
Rather, I believe that the factor of time between expressing and receiving
PTAs and PE is more important than the factor of emotion: (R1) and (S1) are
to be avoided by immediately revealing arguments as PTAs; (R2) and (S2)
can be limited by not immunising themselves against PE for a long time.
With regard to the last point, one could perhaps see an analogy between
religious indoctrination and enlightenment. Again, enlightenment philoso-
phers of the 18th century have repeatedly pointed out that it is a temporal
factor that makes people immune to PE or to better arguments in general
(e.g. indoctrination). is aspect can also be applied to today’s political sit-
uation.
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Which parts of the argument and which actors traditionally fall into the
realm of philosophical epistemology can also be explained by the model: in
(R1) and (S1), there are externalist reasons why PTAs work. It is largely due
to the speed of today’s communication and not to the emotion that PTAs
are increasingly endorsed without a PE taking eect. In my opinion, (R1)
and (S1) address issues and problems that aect media, communication and
political science, as they evoke the question of how to prevent or enlighten
PTAs in new media and political debates as quickly as possible. (R2) and
(S2), on the other hand, touch upon internalist reasons and concern the val-
ues and ideology of the actors.e study of (R2) and (S2) thus falls into the
areas of philosophy, educational science and psychology, since it has to take
into account the material correctness and formal validity of arguments as
well as the openness of the social actors to arguments.
2. Naïve representationalism and rationalism
To analyse the post-truth concept, I have developed a simple model in the
previous section, which does not focus on the concept of emotion. Rather,
I have pointed out that it is the factor of time that sharpens the concept of
post-truth. Social actors who consciously use PTAs for their own benet
deliberately postpone the PE. I also pointed out that it was and still is epis-
temology which must contribute to the analysis of PTAs in the eld of phi-
losophy. is scientic discipline must be expected to provide a model for
analysing and enlightening PTAs. In practice, however, this discipline not
only proves to be incapable of acting, but it even unwittingly supports the
overall diagnosis of a post-truth age. is thesis will be discussed in this
section.
In the history of philosophy, one can put forward various paradigmatic
shis as to why an enlightenment of post-truth arguments cannot be sup-
ported by modern epistemology. At this point, I will mention only a few
shis which have led to the fact that modern epistemology has produced a
very inuential post-truth rationalism in the present, which shows itself to
be incapable of acting against PTAs and thus also against the overall diag-
nosis of a post-truth era.
Whereas Ludwig Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap had favored a theory
in the early days of theViennese Circle that depicted all states of aairs in the
logic of linguistic propositions, from the end of the 1930s onwards they crit-
icized this picture theory as one-sided and reductionist. In the 1950s, Quine
defended the thesis of an “inscrutability of reference,” according to which
the reference of a proposition or its state of aairs cannot be denitively
claried. In the same decade, Wilfrid Sellars spoke of a “myth of the given”
and replaced the idea of extralingual states of aairs or mental states with an
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analysis of inferential relations and semantic contexts. In the 1960s, Edmund
Gettier showed that in some cases the criteria for the concept of knowledge
are generally fullled, but that the truth criterion does not necessarily apply
to all cases subsumed. In the 1970s, Richard Rorty nally draws the conclu-
sion and declares the project of epistemology and semantic analysis to have
failed, since both disciplines are based on the problematic concepts of truth,
the given, reference and depiction.
At the end of these shis there is a very inuential post-truth rational-
ism which (1) laments classical truth theories as components of a naïve rep-
resentationalism and (2) tries to substitute the concept of truth with logical-
syntactic and pragmatic concepts.
(1) An exemplary denition of naïve representationalism states that “A
represents B if and only if A appreciably resembles B,” or “A represents B to
the extent that A resembles B” (Goodman 1968, 3). However, since resem-
blance is reexive and symmetrical, the concept of representation makes no
sense. In addition, the assertion of a resemblance between a proposition (A)
and a state of aairs (B) leads to a hiatus of the intended unity of resem-
blance, namely a separation “into what is by nature a representing and what
by nature can only be represented” (Brandom 2000, 46). A picture theory
must therefore be able to domore than claim a resemblance or unity between
states of aairs and propositions. On the one hand, the attempt to point out
an extra-linguistic state is already part of the language and, on the other
hand, for most of the words we nd no extra-linguistic states to which we
can refer (cf. Peregrin 2014, 25).e dualist theory of modern epistemology
thus necessarily culminates into the impasse of naïve representationalism,
which opens a hiatus between world and logic, that cannot be explained (cf.
Rorty 1980).
(2)e consequence of rationalism is to reject the dualistic theory of a
representation between world and logic and to acknowledge “true” as an in-
trinsic property of language (McDowell 1994). A statement is true if it is con-
sistent with the given logical-syntactic rules and thus becomes expressible in
a specic linguistic context: “‘True’, then, means semantically assertible [. . . ]
and the varieties of truth correspond to the relevant varieties of semantical
rule” (Sellars 1968, 101). “e root notion of truth is then that a sentence
is true just in case, if uttered assertorically, it would have served to make a
correct assertion” (Dummett 1994, 166). e strong rationalism speaks not
only of semantic rules but also and mainly of logic-syntactical derivability:
an assertion is justied if one can deduce it logically from already justied
assertions (cf. Peregrin 2014, section 5).e consequence is that truth is no
longer shown by a mysterious resemblance or unity that naïve representa-
tionalism has declared. Rather, one can speak of “true” when a speaker is
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entitled to do so in accordance with the logical-syntactical rules and when
the proposition is endorsed by recipients in a dialogue. In other words, in
order for a proposition to be declared true, the speaker must not only be
authorized for logical and syntactic reasons, but she and her argument must
also be endorsed by the recipient: “Taking a claim or belief to be true is not
attributing an especially interesting andmysterious property to it; it is doing
something else entirely. It is endorsing the claim oneself ” (Brandom 2000,
119). is results in a dualism again, but this dualism is inter-linguistic. It
consists of a linguistic dialogue between two actors and no longer between a
linguistic proposition and extra-linguistic state of aairs. Truth is no longer
regarded as a reference to the outside world, but is dissolved into internal
language relations and its logical rules (cf. Price 2013).
As a consequence, we can say: not only does the traditional concept of
truth of naïve representationalism thus disappear from epistemology, but it
dissolves into its constituent parts.e general concept of truth is of course
vividly discussed and problematized in contemporary philosophy. But it is
precisely through this discussion and problematization that it is not applied
there in the representationalist sense in which it is needed: A generally ac-
cepted philosophical theory of fact-checking still seems to me to be a long
way o. Instead of the representationalist concept of truth, inuential post-
truth rationalism speaks of entitlement and endorsement. is rareness of
an application-oriented concept of truth in epistemology is thus itself a com-
ponent of our post-truth diagnosis: modern epistemology makes it dicult
to deal with PTAs. Even if the philosophical discussions are prolic and
valuable, they do not oer a solution for political and public debates and are
therefore only a procrastination of enlightenment.
3. Rational representationalism
I have described in section 1 why we should dierentiate between specic
PTAs and a general time diagnosis when examining the concept of post-
truth. e reason for claiming that we live in the age of post-truth is based
on the impression of an increased appearance of PTAs in political, public and
scientic debates. However, these PTAs are not simply emotionally stained
arguments, but they are based on a time delay of the enlightenment, for
whose analysis epistemology should provide a suitable model. However, I
described in section 2 that modern epistemology itself has entered the state
of modern post-truth rationalism through several shis and crises. Instead
of solving the problem of the concept of truth and oering an improved
model of knowledge, epistemology has retreated to an inuential rational-
ism that regards truth oen as a game of entitlement and endorsement.
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In what follows, I will argue that we need an epistemology that neither
falls back into the naivety of representationalism nor into the impracticality
of post-truth rationalism. I believe that the post-truth diagnosis shows us
that epistemology has to do more than to analyse entitlement and endorse-
ment. I will use the Sweden argument as an example to show that speakers
can be syntactically entitled to use PTAs and that recipients pragmatically
endorse these PTAs. Nevertheless, these arguments are so obviously false or
untrue that they must be classied as PTAs.
In the context of epistemology, rational representationalism represents
a middle way, which on the one hand takes the criticism to naïve represen-
tationalism seriously, but on the other hand does not accept that epistemol-
ogy without a representational part makes sense if we want to cope with
the danger of PTAs. I therefore believe that we should include the syntactic
rules of entitlement and the pragmatic reaction of endorsement in our epis-
temology, without substituting them fully with the concept of truth. Truth
should therefore distinguish a dimension that can evaluate arguments inde-
pendently of logical-syntactic entitlement and pragmatic endorsement.
I would like to give an example of why this is necessary. Let us have a
look at the Sweden argument which can be presented as follows:
(1) All countries that do not vet people are not safe, because something
has happened there.
(2) “All countries” includeGermany, Sweden, Belgien (Brussels), France
(Nice, Paris).
(3) We’ve got to keep our country safe andwe have therefore to vet peo-
ple.
It is clear that (3) is the goal of the whole argumentation. Whether (1)
and (2) take on the function of the premises and (3) the function of the con-
clusion depends on the argumentation model we use. With the rationalist
model, this argument cannot be exposed as a PTA: (1), (2) and (3) each cor-
respond to semantic as well as to strong logic-syntactic rules; a deductive
analysis also shows a formal validity, if we regard (3) as a contraposition of
(1); (2) is the backing for (1) and only provides the data at all in order to
accept (1) justiably. If one looks at the emotional reaction of the recipi-
ents who were present when the Sweden argument was expressed, it seems
that the argument was initially endorsed: the recipients belong at least in the
group (R1) and I will still show that some of them also belong to (R2). Ac-
cording to the rationalist model, the substitution concepts of truth, namely
entitlement and endorsement, thus seem to be fullled.
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e original formulation of (2) emphasized that something happened
“last night” in Sweden. is part of (2) is emphasized by the speaker and
presented in an emotional way. But the day aer the argument was put
forward, the Ministry for Foreign Aairs (Utrikesdepartementet) in Swe-
den has linked the argument to the term “post-truth” (postsanning) as the
proposition (2) is partly false or untrue: the Ministry declares that nothing
similar to the events found in the other countries mentioned has happened
(last night and in general) in Sweden and that the argument was therefore
a PTA.at is also the reason why it nally became known as the “Sweden
argument.”
We can regard this statement by the Ministry as a crucial part of the PE
to the Sweden-PTA.e explanation that (2) is a PTA implicitly includes a
counter-argument that also concerns (1) and (3): if nothing has happened in
Sweden, then Sweden is not one of the countries that can be included in (1).
It is also true that Sweden does not vet people (any more than in the other
countries mentioned). But since nothing has happened in Sweden, it is not
true that all countries that do not vet people are not safe. If (1) is not generally
true, then the contraposition (3) is also problematic. However, we can only
question the inference from (1) to (3) if we also see (1) as problematic. is
is made possible above all by the criticism of (2).
e PE thus shows that a part of the argument, namely (1) and (2), can-
not be checked deductively, but only inductively and through a representa-
tionalist approach. (2) represents a series of facts that can only be checked
by referential processes, but not only by entitlement and endorsement. Nor
does the validity of the argument depend on the emotional eect, even if
such a reaction is accompanied by the speaker and recipient of the argument.
e fact that the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Aairs does not endorse the
argument, unlike (R1) and (R2), is only possible through a referential “fact
check,” but not through logical-syntactical rules or by approving others: (1),
(2) or (3) are not questioned as being semantic-syntactically entitled. Fur-
thermore, (2) is endorsed by (R2) even if (R1) has entitled EP. We see this in
the fact that a few days aer the publication of the ministry’s tweet, recipi-
ents (R2)maintain their opinion and claim that the argument had been right
all along. If you look at other arguments that are treated as paradigmatic for
PTAs, you almost always see that they contain inductive partial arguments
that cannot be decided with the help of post-truth rationalism or only with
the help of a theory of argumenta ad passiones.
I have presented the approach of rational representationalism here using
only one example of epistemology. Finally, I would like to give some short
comments on what distinguishes naïve from rational representationalism in
general: I have already pointed out that rational representationalism, un-
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like naïve representation, does not exclude the logical-semantic and prag-
matic dimension. In contrast to post-truth rationalism, however, it does not
dissolve the concept of representation and truth into semantic-logical and
pragmatic dimensions. Rather, it points out that the dualism of the con-
cept of truth is located in linguistic terms, but is not limited to the linguistic
dimensions between speaker and recipient. e basic idea of rational rep-
resentationalism is based on the indication that representations are not a
mysterious characteristic, as post-truth rationalists claim, but have always
been an essential part of language. is is demonstrated by the fact that in
language there are basic expressions such as “depicting, “conclusion,” “in-
cluding,” etc., without which we do not understand the arguments we are
talking about.osemetaphors are residual elements of representations that
have remained contained in the rational expression of human beings. Only
by understanding the role of representation in our language we can under-
stand what we mean when we say that rationalism includes representation
or that post-truth is a procrastination of enlightenment.
Bibliography
Brandom, R. (2000). Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Dummett, M. A. E. (1994). e Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, MA.
Goodman, N. (1968). Languages of Art: An Approach to aeory of Symbols,
Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis.
McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and World: With a New Introduction, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Peregrin, J. (2014). Inferentialism, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
Price, H. (2013). Prospects for global expressivism, inH. Price, S. Blackburn,
R. Brandom, P. Horwich and M. Williams (eds), Expressivism, Pragma-
tism and Representationalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
pp. 145–194.
Rorty, R. (1980). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton Univeristy
Press, Princeton.
Sellars, W. (1968). Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantianemes,
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
